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Alfred North Whitehead offered to the twentieth century a 
metaphysical system purporting to transcend the impasse of 
materialism and idealism, synthesize the quantum- and wave- 
theories of the transmission of energy, establish a non-empirical 
basis for all geometry, and account for human freedom, cosmic 
evolution, and Einsteinian physics. The sheer virtuosity of 
such a performance is staggering; and it is hardly surprising 
that Whitehead includes in his system an explanation for God 
and his relationship to the world. 
Nor is it surprising, in a generation that is not entirely satis- 
fied with classical, liberal, or neo-Reformation ideas of God, 
that there should be a serious attempt to use Whitehead's 
thought as a philosophical framework for a modern Christian 
understanding of deity. To this task John B. Cobb, Jr. im- 
plicitly committed hmself in 1962, and A Chrzstiart Natzcral 
Theology 3 is the first major result of his constructive effort. 
The present article offers a brief, highly condensed summary of 
Whitehead's idea of God, a short exposition of Cobb's develop- 
This dissatisfaction is most clearly seen in the so-called "God is 
dead" emphasis of several younger American theologians-notably 
Paul Van Buren, Thomas J . J . Altizer, and William Hamilton-deriv- 
ing from such sources as Bultmann, Bonhoeffer, and contemporary 
analytic philosophy. Hamilton has described this viewpoint in "The 
Death of God Theology," The Christian Scholar, XLVIII (1965), 27-48. 
Cf. statements by Van Buren, Altizer, and Hamilton in the series "How 
I Am Making Up My Mind," CC, LXXXII (1965), 428-30, 864-67, 
1219-22. 
Cf. his Living Options i n  Protesta.nt Theology: A Survey of Methods 
(Philadelphia, 1962)~ pp.  14-15. 3 15-16. 
A Christian Natural Theology : Based on the Thought of Alfred North 
Whitehead (Philadelphia, r 965). 
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ment and revision of this idea, and some critical comments on 
both method and result. 
For Whitehead, philosophy is the ultimate generalization of 
relationships, including all relationships of all entities that can 
in any sense be said to exist. This means that if there is the 
entity "God," it too must come within the domain of meta- 
physical rationalization. The following paragraphs are based 
on Whitehead's explication of his idea of God in Science and ifhe 
Modem World (originally published in 1925)~ ti Religion in the 
Making (1926), Process and Reality ( ~ g z g ) ,  and Adventures 
of Ideas (1933). with supplementary reference to Modes of 
Tkozcght (1938). 
The ultimate metaphysical principle in Whitehead's system 
is not God but "creativity" (PR I I) ; in the formal statement 
of the categorial scheme (PR 30-42) "God" does not appear at  
all, either specifically or by implication. Thus "God" is a 
Whitehead's own vocabulary has been used wherever possible, 
with the first occurrence of each technical term enclosed in quotation 
marks. More detailed introduction to Whitehead's idea of God may be 
found in Cobb's summary in A Christian Natural Theology, pp. 135-75 ; 
Ivor Leclerq, Whitehead's Metaphysics : An Introductory Exposition 
(London, 1958)~ pp. 195-208 ; and William A. Christian, A n  Interpreta- 
tion of Whitehead's Meta$&ysics (New Haven, 1959)' pp. 283-413. The 
basic interpretative statement is Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead's 
Idea of God," in The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. Paul 
Arthur Schilpp (Evanston, Ill., 1g41), pp. 515-59. 
6 Hereafter cited as "SMW." Page references are to the New 
American Library (Mentor) edition (New York, 1948). 
6 Hereafter cited as "RM." Page references are to the World Publish- 
ing Co. (Meridian/Living Age) edition (Cleveland, 1960). 
7 Hereafter cited as "PR." Page references are to the Harper 
Torchbooks (The Academy Library) edition (New York, 1960). and 
are identical to the Macmillan edition (New York, 1929). 
8 Hereafter cited as "AI." Page references are to the New American 
Library (Mentor) edition (New Y ork, I 955). 
@ Hereafter cited as "MT." Page references are to the Capricorn 
edition (New York, 1958), and are identical to the Macmillan edition 
(New York, 1938). 
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derivative notion, lo a thoroughly comprehensible element 
(A1 171-72) in the philosophical explanation of the world as we 
know it. 
By itself creativity is pure, abstract actuality, "without a 
character of its own" (PR 47). I t  is the function of God, as the 
"principle of concretion" (PR 374), to give form to actuality ; 
that is, he l1 is the ultimate limitation of actualization in the 
sense that he determines " (i) the special logical relationships 
which all events conform to, (ii) the selection of relationships 
to which the events do conform, and (iii) the particularity 
which infects the course even within these general relationships 
of logic and causation" (SMW 160). In terms of directionality, 
the function of God is "to sustain the aim at vivid experience" 
(MT 128). But this is not determinism; rather, "the indeter- 
mination of mere creativity is transmuted into a determinate 
freedom" (RM 88). Yet it is precisely these limitations that 
establish the difference between good and evil (SMW 161). 
God is at once both the primordial qualification of actuality 
and its non-derivative, unconditioned actualization (RM gg ; 
PR 48, 522). Since there is in the universe "only one genus of 
actual entities" (PR 168)) God is, like all other beings, a "crea- 
ture" and part of the world (PR 102), "a factor in the universe" 
(RM 71). Among the characteristics which God shares with 
other actual entities are these: the basic function of decision 
amid potentiality (PR 68) ; "dipolarity," which is the combina- 
tion of "mental" (though not always conscious) and "physical" 
10 Cf. Christian, "The Concept of God as a Derivative Notion," in 
Process and Divinity : The Hartshor.lze Festschrift, ed. William L. Reese 
and Eugene Freeman (La Salle, Ill., 1964), pp. 182-89. 
11 Whitehead regularly used the pronoun "he" in referring to God, 
but this was merely following convention and not an indication of 
"personality" in God (cf. RM 60-64) as in traditional Christian thought. 
Had Whitehead used a different proper noun to refer to God (such as 
"Eros," which occurs occasionally in AI), he would certainly have used 
( I '  I, it rather than "he" where such a pronoun was required. His reason 
for using "God" was that "the contemplation of our natures, as enjoin- 
ing real feelings derived from the timeless source of all order, acquires 
that 'subjective form' of refreshment and companionship at  which 
religions aim" (PR 47). 
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relationships with other entities (PR 54) ; a threefold nature, 
namely, "primordial," "consequent," and "superjective" (PR 
134) ; transcendence over-that is, a certain freedom from the 
causal influence of-all other entities (PR 136, 339) in the 
sense of self-creation or self-causation (RM 99; PR 339) ; and 
a capacity to function as instruments of novelty for other 
entities (PR 529). 
On the other hand, there is a certain uniqueness in God in 
terms of both nature and function. He alone is non-temporal 
(PR 73; RM 88) and transcends any finite cosmic epoch (PR 
143; MT 128) ; he alone has no character "given" by the past 
(PR 134). He is further distinguished by the fact that he 
originates from the mental rather than the physical "pole" of 
his being (PR 54, 528) ; he is the ground of all mentality (PR 
529) and the ultimate referent of truth (PR 19). He is charac- 
terized by the priority of permanence rather than flux in his 
nature, and unity rather than multiplicity (PR 529). To main- 
tain an awareness of this singularity, Whitehead excludes God 
from the meaning of "actual occasions,') a term whch desig- 
nates all other actual entities (PR 135). 
God is related to the rest of the world through his primordial 
and consequent natures. The primordial nature is an abstrac- 
tion, deficient in actuality (PR 50), but not therefore devoid of 
efficacy (PR 530). I t  is this aspect of God that functions as the 
principle of concretion (PR 374, 523) ; his primordial nature 
consists in conceptualizing and valuating all the "eternal 
objects" or categories of possibility in the universe (SMW 88, 
99-100; PR 46, 70, 134, 382, 392) and then relating them to 
each "concrescent" (this term functions as a present-participial 
form of "concrete") occasion as its "subjective aim," that is, 
its ideal of actualization in harmony with its actual situation 
in the world (RM 91,146-48 ; PR 134,248,343). In other words, 
it is the primordial nature of God that makes pure potentiality 
into real potentiality for an actual entity (PR 69-73). And it is 
by means of his primordial nature that God is immanent in the 
world as the ground of the relationship between physical and 
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mental "prehensions" (PR 78)) the contacts between actuali- 
ties by means of which one appropriates (and thus is affected 
by) another as a component of its own essence. Thus God is the 
"supreme Eros" (A1 ZOI), the "eternal urge of desire" (PR 522) 
that guides the ongoing advance of novelty a t  every stage so 
that it moves toward the realization of the ultimate perfection 
which is his own ultimate satisfaction as the fulfillment of his 
own subjective aim (PR 134 ; A1 251, 274-76). This fulfillment 
constitutes God's superj ective nature. 
In this way the primordial nature of God is the ground of 
both novelty and order. Without his conceptualization and 
organization of eternal objects as possibilities for actualization, 
there would be no progress toward the deeper reality, the in- 
tensification of experience that is the goal of the creative 
process; for eternal objects apart from God are without 
influence, and without his structuring of the totality of eternal 
objects, novelty itself would result in sheer chaos in the uni- 
verse (RM 151-53; PR 46, 73, 75, 161, 164, 248, 377, 523; MT 
128). While the efficacy of the primordial nature does not 
eliminate the creative freedom of actual occasions, its envisage- 
ment of relationships is so complete that it is "not added to, or 
disturbed by" any actualization of creativity (RM 147). 
Complementing the primordial nature of God is his conse- 
quent nature, which is (or results from) his own physical 
prehension of the actualities of the evolving universe (PR 134, 
527,530). In  contrast to the primordial nature, the consequent 
nature of God is described as conscious, incomplete, condi- 
tioned, actual, and everlasting (PR 524). Having "prehended" 
the self-creating entities of the world into its own developing 
wholeness, the consequent nature of God is in turn prehended 
by new occasions, of whose world it is always a part. Thus God 
again (in addition to the "objectification" of his primordial 
nature for conceptual prehension by concrescent occasions) 
becomes a constitutive factor in the world, l2 and perishing 
la Cf. Daniel Day Williams, "How Does God Act? An Essay in 
Whitehead's Metaphysics," in Process and Divinity, pp. 178-80. 
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occasions are granted the fulfillment of their yearning for 
immortality (PR 533). Moreover, God's everlasting consequent 
nature may be related to the human "soul" in such a way that 
the latter "may be freed from its complete dependence on 
bodily organization" (A1 209)) since the mental poles of occa- 
sions are not subject to measurable time and space (A1 247). 
Finally, here God may be understood in terms of a tender care 
that nothing of value be lost, as well as in terms of wisdom, 
patience, and love for the world (PR 525, 527, 532). But the 
"power" of God is not anything like intervention; it is the 
worship he inspires (SMW 172). 
It is clearly the primordial rather than the consequent 
nature of God that fundamentally distinguishes him from the 
rest of the world and involves him in the creative process. 
Although God may be described as "Creator" because of his 
objectification for actual occasions as the ground for advance 
into novelty, this designation has unfortunate and misleading 
connotations of priority, ultimacy, volition, sovereignty, omni- 
potence, and personality (PR 343-44, 520). These elements of 
the Semitic concept of God (RM 66) have remained in Christian 
thought and are mischievous theologically as well as philo- 
sophically (A1 171-74) ; on one hand they make God the source of 
evil (SMW 161) and on the other they put him beyond meta- 
physical conceptualization (RM 68). It is better therefore to 
say not that God is before all creation but that he is with all 
creation (PR ~ z I ) ,  and to say not that he creates the world but 
that he saves it (PR 526). God and the world require each 
other; they are mutually interdependent (PR 528 ; AT 173). l3 
Whitehead insists that he is not, like Descartes and Leibniz, 
introducing God into his system as an emergency measure to 
save the metaphysical principles from collapse (PR 78, 219, 
289), because for him God is not an exception to these princi- 
18 Hartshorne, p. 521, offers this interpretative modification: "The 
world could.. . have been different from what i t  is, but some sort of 
world must have been 'there,' that is, must have been the content to 
the divine knower and the effect of the divine cause." 
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ples but rather their chief exemplification (PR 521). God is 
therefore intentionally secularized and rationalized (PR 515- 
16 ; A1 171-72). The rationalization is almost complete-but 
not quite: for why the relationships among the entities of the 
universe are what they are is a mystery of God's nature. No 
other reason can be given for them because that nature is the 
ground of rationality itself (SMW 160-61) ; they can only be 
discovered as they are. Finally, "the concept of 'God' is the 
way in which we understand this incredible fact-that what 
cannot be [namely, the correlation of opposites in actualiza- 
tion], yet is" (PR 531). 
This then is Whitehead's God: a combination of creature- 
liness and primordiality, dependence and transcendence, con- 
ceptualization and actualization, mentality and physicality, 
novelty and order, conditionedness and freedom, objectifica- 
tion and prehension, rationality and irrationality, abstraction 
and concrescence. I t  must be admitted that in some ways such 
a God seems more impressive as a Supreme Being than is the 
God of classical Christian theism. 14 
I I 
Cobb emphasizes that his intention in A Christian Natural 
Theology is not to diverge from Whitehead's own basic view- 
point, approach, and objective; rather he is attempting to 
understand God's being and relationships entirely in terms of 
the principles that characterize Whitehead's system IS--a goal 
which, according to Cobb, Whitehead himself failed to achieve. 
The program of revision involves five points. 
lP Cf. Hartshorne, p. 523. 
l6 In the dedication of his book to Hartshorne, Cobb acknowledges 
the importance of the latter's influence. Cf. the evaluation Cobb gives 
in " 'Perfection Exists' : A Critique of Charles Hartshorne," RL, 
XXXII (1962-63), p. 302 : "In my persona1 view Hartshorne's greatest 
achievement is not his brilliant revival of certain arguments for the 
existence of God but his development of a concept of God fully com- 
patible with all that we know about the world, self-consistent within 
itself, and of profound religious significance. " 
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(I) Cobb disagrees first with Whitehead's dichotomizing of 
God's nature, l6 observing that "too often he deals with the 
two natures as if they were genuinely separable. Further, he 
frequently writes as though God were simply the addition of 
these two natures. Thus God's primordial nature performs 
certain functions and his consequent nature others" (p. 178). 
This systematic disjunction not only neglects the fundamental 
unity of God as an actual entity, but also involves a misunder- 
standing of the functions of the two natures in relation to the 
world, making it impossible to explain "how the eternally 
unchanging primordial nature of God can provide different 
initial aims to every occasion" (pp. 179-80). 
Cobb would solve this problem by suggesting that God's own 
subjective aim at intensity of feeling involves (a) a proposition- 
al prehension concerning the satisfaction of each becoming 
occasion within its peculiar situation in the world, and (b) the 
actualization of himself in such a way that it maximizes the 
possibility of that satisfaction. The concrescent occasion then 
prehends this prehension, which in turn forms part of the initial 
phase of the occasion's own subjective aim. Thus the initial 
aim for the new occasion is included in its "initial data" and is 
not a distinct element as Whitehead describes i t ;  and it comes 
from the totality of God's nature and not from the primordial 
nature only. Moreover, Cobb holds that the initial aim may 
derive in part from other (preceding) actual occasions which, 
like God, can have propositional prehensions concerning the 
satisfactions of the new occasion (although the role of God 
remains decisive). And Cobb also suggests that there are other 
prehensions of God quite similar to those involved in the 
provision of the initial aim. In short, the reception of the initial 
Is I t  is characteristic of Whitehead's thought that in PR the pri- 
mordial nature of God is discussed in almost complete separation from 
the consequent nature; the former is almost wholly missing from the 
final chapter, "God and the World," and the latter appears hardly 
anywhere else. 
l7 Williams, pp. 161-180, notes the need to emphasize the unity of 
God, but maintains a distinction in the functions of the two natures. 
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aim from God is not unlike an occasion's other prehensions of 
God or its prehensions of other entities. 
(2) Another proposed revision concerns the relation of time 
and personness in God. Whitehead repeatedly refers to God as 
"an actual entity," but he also asserts that in distinction from 
all other entities God is non-temporal (that is, eternal) in 
regard to his primordial nature and everlasting (that is, 
cumulative of all elements of process without loss) in regard to 
his consequent nature. Cobb concludes that these latter 
assertions about God and time "compel us to assimilate God 
more closely to the conception of a living person than to that 
of an actual entity" (p. 188), so that he should be understood 
as "a succession of moments of experience with a special 
continuity7' (p. 188 ; cf. pp. 71-79). 
Now Whitehead recognizes two kinds of time: (a) time as 
transition between occasions, the time of the efficacy of causal 
sequence, or "physical timeJJ ; and (2) time within occasions, 
the non-divided time of internal process. If God is an actual 
entity, then his time is the latter kind and process in him is 
to  be understood as the internal process of concrescence. 
But in that case the question of his efficacy in the world 
becomes acute; for efficacy is understood by Whitehead 
only in terms of succession; efficacy always means non-con- 
temporaneity, and if God has no past he cannot be objectified 
for (that is, affect) the world. But Whitehead himself insists 
on the efficacy of God's consequent nature; and on the basis 
of the unity of God's nature (as Cobb argues) even the provi- 
sion of the initial aim for each occasjon involves efficacy. 
Furthermore, God's experience of his own satjsfaction-an 
experience that comes at  the completion of an entity-implies 
that as a continuing existent he is something other or at least 
more than an entity. l8 
So Cobb understands God as in important respects similar 
to what we know as personness. But this idea has its own 
problems, for in Whitehead's thought persons lack complete 
l8 Hartshorne, pp. 544-50, moves in the same direction. 
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self-identity through time and experience loss of what is past. 
Cobb therefore suggests that God "vividly and consciously 
remembers in every new occasion all the occasions of the 
past" (p. 191) ; since all the occasions of the past are included 
in his own past, he thus maintains his identity and loses 
nothing of value in spite of the real pastness of his past. 
Finally, the idea of God as a living person requires that his 
conceptualization of the totality of eternal objects be con- 
ceived as a succession of acts, just as Whitehead understands 
a succession of occasions in the single "experience" of looking 
at  a picture for, say, a minute. God is thus a personal succes- 
sion of unimaginably rapid occasions. lD Cobb maintains 
"that the chief reasons for insisting that God is an actual 
entity can be satisfied by the view that he is a living person, 
that this view makes the doctrine of God more coherent, and 
that no serious new difficulties are raised" (p. 192). 
(3) Yet another problem is the relation of God to space. 
Although Whitehead does not attend specifically to this 
question, his system allows three possibilities: God may be 
local, or nonspatial, or omnispatial. Of these, the first is ruled 
out by the fact that God is related with equal immediacy to 
occasions everywhere in space. The second was probably 
the position tacitly assumed by Whitehead, thinking of God 
primarily in terms of his primordial nature and its conceptual 
prehension by actual occasions apart from spatial relations. 
In fact, his system admits the theoretical possibility that 
"physical experience may also be prehended apart from 
contiguityJ' (p. 194). 
But the idea of God as nonspatial creates an essential 
difference between God and other actual entities, all of which 
have regional standpoints; and it is Cobb's aim to reduce 
such differences wherever possible. So he suggests that God 
Is These must be rapid enough to enable God to discriminate between 
non-synchronous electronic occasions. In contrast, human personal 
occasions succeed each other a t  a rate of approximately 10 per second, 
according to Cobb. 
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too is spatial, and since his standpoint "could not be such 
as to favor one part of the universe over others, it must be 
all-inclusive" (p. 195). The only problem is the question of the 
possibility of the inclusion of the region of one occasion 
within the region of another. Having already argued in favor 
of this possibility in regard to the relationship of human 
experience to the brain (pp. 82-91), Cobb easily draws an 
analogous conclusion here. At the same time he recognizes 
that there is no real issue here except metaphysical consisten- 
cy. If God is nonspatial, he is equally related to all regions 
and occasions, and it is as if he were omnispatial ; thus it seems 
more logical to affirm that he is omnispatial. 
(4) Next Cobb turns to the uniqueness of God's function 
in relating eternal objects to actual occasions, and here he sees 
another element of incoherence : Whitehead seems to introduce 
God in order to explain the efficacy of eternal objects in the 
concrescence of actual occasions, without relating this function 
to the other elements of the system or explaining it in terms 
of the system. The resulting problem is two-fold: "First, it 
seems that God renders eternal objects effective for actual 
occasions in a way radicdly different from that in which 
temporal occasions make them effective for each other. 
Second, God seems to envisage eternal objects in a way for 
which the conceptual prehensions of actual occasions provide 
no analogy" (p. 198). 
The first part of the problem is partially resolved by Cobb's 
previous idea that the subjective aim of an occasion derives 
initially not only from God but also from past occasions 
which, like God, include propositional prehensions of novelty- 
that is, possibilities of actualization-for the new occasion. 
In other words, the uniqueness of God is not radical; he 
"envisages and orders all eternal objects, whereas temporal 
occasions can order only an infinitesimal selection of eternal 
objects" (p. 201). This argument brings us to the second part 
of the problem, for it suggests that, in principle, actual 
occasions can prehend eternal objects directly and that, as 
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is the case in regard to God, "their own decisions can be 
explanatory of the conceptual prehensions not derived from 
physical prehensions" (p. 202). 20 Cobb does not insist that 
this in fact happens, only that it is not categorically impos- 
sible. And again there remains a vast difference in degree; 
the point is simply that "a temporal occasion may have toward 
some eternal object the kind of relationship God has toward 
all" (p. 203). If this does happen, Cobb thinks that its occur- 
rence may well be connected with the highly reflective con- 
sciousness of human occasions. 
Thus Cobb would replace the formulation in Process and 
Reality of a unique relationship of God to eternal objects 
with Whitehead's earlier but presumably more adequate 
statement that "the forms belong no more to God than to 
any one occasion" (RM 157). 
(5) Finally, Cobb offers a clarification of the role of God in 
creation. For Whitehead, God's creative function consists of 
contributing the initial phase of the subjective aim of each 
new occasion, thereby determining which preceding occasions 
it will prehend and how they will be objectified for it. Thus 
God in effect selects the causal factors in each occasion. 
But his responsibility is not absolute, for it is qualified by 
(a) thegivenness of the situation, (b) the freedom of each occa- 
sion to adjust its own aim, (c) the presupposition of eternal 
objects which God does not create, and (d) the temporal and 
a0 The two aspects of the problem seem more closely related than 
Cobb's separate discussion of them suggests. For the argument for the 
partial derivation of the subjective aim from preceding occasions pre- 
supposes the possibility in them of some genuine novelty not derived 
from God. Otherwise it  is only a matter of the directness or indirectness 
of God's own provision of the subjective aim, a function that is not 
paralleled in any other actual entities; and if this is so, Cobb's whole 
point of increased coherence is lost. 
21 How this might occur-that is, on what basis and according to 
what criteria a concrescent occasion might adjust itself-whitehead 
does not explain. Presumably this is the Whiteheadian approach to 
the mystery of self-determination, which he does not limit to personal 
occasions but extends to all actual entities. This is ultimately the source 
of evil (cf. infra, section V). 
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ontological equiprimordiality of the world (or conversely, 
the absence of any original creatio ex nihilo). Thus God is not, 
in Whitehead's thought, the ultimate reason why there is 
anything at all instead of nothing. 
I t  is the function of God to give efficacy to creativity, which 
is itself not an actual entity and does not "exist," and there- 
fore cannot function as the "creator" of anything. On the 
other hand, however, creativity is not merely one of the totali- 
ty of eternal objects; for eternal objects express pure possibili- 
ties indeterminate to any one occasion, and creativity is 
necessary if there is to be any occasion at all. Therefore 
creativity is neither abstract in the usual sense, nor actual or 
concrete. But, Cobb observes, it is still far from clear why 
there is anything, for the idea of creativity itself does not 
explain why creativity continues to be actualized: "It seems 
just as possible that i t  will simply stop, that there wil l  be then 
just nothing. . . . If occasions ceased to occur, then there 
would be no creativity. Creativity can explain only ex post 
facto" (p. 2x1). The conclusion is that God is not only the 
limitation of the form of existence but also the "reasonJJ 
(whatever that is) why anything exists, so that "God's role 
in creation is more radical and fundamental than Whitehead's 
language usually suggestsJ' (pp. zxx-12). Once more this is 
not intended as a departure from the essential Whitehead, 
but a closer adherence to his own definitions and principles in 
order to increase the coherence of the system as a whole. 
Like Whitehead, Cobb refuses to claim for God "either 
eminent reality or necessary existenceJJ (p. 213); 22 God is 
simply an infinite series of occasions, but since he exists he 
will continue to exist everlastingly because he aims to do so 
and has the power to do so. 
In concluding his proposed clarification of Whitehead's 
doctrine of God, Cobb reiterates his contention that although 
the function of God is not radically different from that of 
This of course reflects a refusal to follow Hartshorne's revival of 
the ontological argument for the existence of God. 
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other actual entities, it is decisive. Without him, neither 
creativity nor the past nor both together could provide a 
future. "God always (and some temporal occasions sometimes) 
is the reason that each new occasion becomes. God, past 
occasions, and the new occasion are conjointly the reason 
for what i t  becomes. Whatever it becomes, it will always, 
necessarily, be a new embodiment of creativity" (p. 214). 
Cobb asks (p. 269) to be judged according to the soundness 
of his philosophy. In general he seems successful in raising 
significant questions by identifying important elements of 
incoherence in Whitehead's doctrine of God. But he seems 
somewhat less successful in providing answers in terms of 
acceptable alternative f orrnulations. 
Whitehead's dichotomized and mostly abstract God is 
clearly unsatisfactory. Although he insists that God is an 
actual entity, he generally ignores just those elements of his 
being (namely, his consequent nature) that are necessary for 
him to be actual. The fact that Whitehead finds it hardly 
necessary to mention the consequent nature of God at all 
until it appears as the subject of the final chapter of Process 
a.nd Reality makes a certain feeling of incoherence ines- 
capable. 23 Nor is the situation improved by Whitehead's 
reference to the peculiarly religious involvement of God's 
consequent nature (for example, the idea of God as love, 
patience, and companionship) at the end of an intentionally 
secularized system of metaphysics. If God is really to be 
understood as an actual entity, the system requires some such 
adjustment as Cobb offers. And his suggestions toward an 
understanding of the unity of God's nature and function are 
23 The greatest of several difficulties encountered by readers of 
PR lies in the fact that every argument seems to presuppose everything 
that follows it, so that the beginning is just as unintelligible without 
the end as the end is without the beginning. The notion of the conse- 
quent nature of God is a remarkable exemption from this circularity. 
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in harmony with the overall system, in which actual entities 
regularly function and are prehended as unities. 
The crucial question which arises at this point is whether 
this unitary functioning of God implies a pastness in God 
parallel to the pastness of prehended actual occasions. In order 
to accommodate the fact that God influences the world (that is, 
is efficacious in the provision of the initial phase of the sub- 
jective aim of occasions by the objectification of his primordial 
nature, and in the influence of his consequent nature-or 
better, in Cobb's view, in both together), one must concur with 
Cobb's rejection of the view that God is afi actual entity; and 
understanding God in some sort of analogy to "a living person" 
is an attractive suggestion, especially in the light of the 
Biblical picture of a "living God." But in the framework of 
Whiteheadian thought this idea is not as free of systematic 
difficulties as Cobb assumes. 
What is a "person" ? For Whitehead "an enduring person- 
ality" is "a route of occasions in which the successors with 
some completeness sum up their predecessors" (PR 531) ; 
Cobb applies this description to God, appropriately revising 
"some completeness" to "absolute completeness." But he 
neglects to seek for the grozmd of the route of occasions. In the 
temporal world, that ground is God, whose unitary primordial 
nature provides the initial aim for each occasion and thus 
furnishes order in successive occasions, in enduring objects, 
in living persons, and in the totality of the universe. As long 
as God is auc actual entity there is no problem, for everything 
is held together by the unity of that one non-temporal, 
transepochal entity. If, however, God is not arz entity but a 
series of ontologically discrete actualizations, the question of 
the ground of his unity becomes impossible to answer within 
the system. 24 NOW Cobb is not unaware of this problem, but 
This weakness was first brought to my attention in conversation 
with Langdon Gilkey. Subsequent to the preparation of the present 
article, Gilkey has published an extensive review of A Christian 
Natural Theology in TAT, XXII (1965-66), 530-545, in which he takes 
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his proposed solution in terms of the completeness of God's 
prehension of his own past as well as all pastness of all oc- 
casions seems to fall short. For " 'life' means novelty" 
(PR 159)) and thus to say that God's total prehension of the 
past is the ground of his self-identity through time is of dubious 
meaning. And simply to affirm this self-identity and continuity 
is of course just the kind of arbitrariness that Cobb intends to 
avoid. 
In  view of the persuasiveness of Cobb's argument concerning 
the difference between the role of actual entities and role of 
God in Whitehead's system, not to mention the formidable 
set of distinctions indicated by Whitehead himself (cf. sufira, 
p. 3), it would seem possible and perhaps more satisfactory 
to follow the master's lead in the direction opposite to that 
in which Cobb moves, and admit God as one of the categorial 
ultimates in the system, with no more need to assimilate him 
either to actual entities or to persons than there is to assimilate 
creativity to eternal objects. I t  is interesting that Cobb 
himself enumerates "the four ultimate elements" as "actual 
occasions, God, eternal objects, and creativity" (p. 177). 
He rightly objects to ('arbitrary disconnection," but the 
disconnection here seems more essential than arbitrary. 
Of course the disconnection need not be absolute ; there is 
no reason why these ultimate elements may not show some 
similarities to each other such as Cobb notes between creativity 
and eternal objects. Thus the important emphasis Cobb gives 
to the fundamental unity of God and his relationships to the 
world need not be lost. 
On the other hand, if God is affirmed as a fourth ultimate 
rather than an entity within the category of actual entities, 
some of Cobb's arguments seem unnecessary or at least 
unimportant. In the first place, the incentive for maintaining 
the omnispatiality of God is considerably weakened. Since 
creativity and eternal objects are nonspatial, there seems no 
issue with Cobb on some of the problems mentioned here in sections 
111-v. 
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intrinsic reason to favor the notion of God's spatiality (and 
hence omnispatiality) just because of the spatiality of actual 
entities. As Cobb recognizes, the question makes no difference 
for the actualization of any occasion, and may therefore be 
argued on other grounds (if any) or left open. In the second 
place, if God is in a category separate from actual entities, 
there is no essential reason to argue for the capacity of actual 
occasions either to have propositional prehensions of novelty 
for subsequent occasions or to prehend eternal objects 
directly; God can hold this capacity uniquely. Of course, if 
Cobb is in fact correct in his affirmation of this capacity for 
all actual entities, his denial of the eminent reality and 
necessary being of God is readily understandable; but in that 
case it would be difficult to see on what ground he also affirms 
the "radical decisiveness" of God's role in creation. 
A final reason for taking a path opposite from Cobb's 
assimilation of God to actual entities is the very cogency of 
his argument for giving God a more fundamental role in 
creation than does Whitehead. He demonstrates convincingly 
that pure creativity is even less adequate an explanation for 
the existence of actualities than was Aristotle's "prime 
matter," and that God "must be conceived as being the reason 
that entities occur at all as well as determining the limits 
within which they can achieve their own forms" (p. 211). 
But if God is in some sense the ground of being of actual 
entities (in precisely what sense, he does not spell out), it is 
surely creating confusion to understand God either as an 
actual entity or as a series of actual entities with a special 
continuity. Cobb's revision of Whitehead thus seems to be 
moving in two different directions. In contrast, a redefinition 
of God in the context of an ultimate quaternity of elements 
(Creativity, Creative Forms, Creator, and Creature, each 
presupposing the other three), while attributing to God a 
reality and necessity denied by both Whitehead and Cobb, 
would nevertheless avoid the problems that Cobb has en- 
countered in his development of a Whiteheadian view of God. 
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But incorporating into Whiteheadian thought the idea of 
God as wi generis is perhaps impossible. At least it would 
raise for the Whiteheadians the same perplexing question that 
has harassed Christian theology for centuries and has been 
sharply reemphasized by the impact of analytic philosophy : 
on what basis is any language about God meaningful? If God 
cannot be understood in terms of the category of actual 
entities, can he be understood at all? Or must he remain 
essentially an unknown quantity ? While Christian theology 
might be willing to live permanently with these questions, 
Whiteheadian metaphysics can hardly do so; for the whole 
thrust of its doctrine of God has been toward complete 
intelligibility. Therefore, although Whitehead's own view 
(God as aut actual entity) is quite unacceptable, both Cobb's 
alternative (God as a "living person") and the one suggested 
here (God as categorially unique) seem to engender more 
difficulties for Whiteheadian thought than they resolve. 
Another and no less crucial problem in A Christian Natwal  
Theology concerns methodology. Now there is a certain irony 
in suggesting that methodology is a problem for John Cobb ; 
for he is acutely aware, and has done much to make others 
aware, of the place of method in the understanding and 
evaluation of theological systems. His Living OPtiom in 
Protestant Theology is aptly subtitled "A Survey of Methods," 
and he has concluded the presentation of his own philosophical 
theology with a 32-page explanation of the way in which the 
theological task in general and philosophical theology in 
particular should be undertaken. And he has said the right 
things. He has noted the similarities as well as the differences 
between theology and philosophy, and he has pointed out that 
philosophical theology overlaps both of these disciplines while 
being identical with neither. Therefore "natural theology" 
is not the old and hopeless endeavor to ground Christian 
thought on neutral, universally acknowledged rational 
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principles; it is rather the systematic explication of the 
presuppositions of Christian thought-presuppositions which 
are inevitably subject to critical evaluation from non- 
theological viewpoints, that is, in the context of more general 
reflection. Cobb establishes the necessity of this kind of 
enterprise by showing that if it is not taken seriously the 
result is not no natural theology but an unconscious, un- 
criticized-and therefore probably poor and possibly alien- 
natural theology, with the consequence that the whole 
theological structure is weakened. He cites Augustine and 
Thomas Aquinas as classical examples of natural theology 
in its most practical form: the adaptation and development 
of an available philosophy so that it can serve as a "Christian 
natural theology." Cobb intends his own work on Whitehead 
to be a similar endeavor. 
He explains why he has chosen Whitehead's philosophy to 
revise and use as a framework for Christian theology : (a) it is 
intrinsically excellent as a philosophical system; (b) its vision 
of reality is compatible with that of the Christian faith ; and 
(c) it corresponds with his own fundamental vision of reality. 
Now about (a) there is no argument, and about (c) Cobb 
himself is the only competent judge. But it seems strange that 
(b) is so quickly assumed-and on the curiously inadequate 
basis that Whitehead's own environment was culturally 
influenced by Christianity (in a way the environment of 
Aristotle or even Plotinus was not). Since the compatibility of 
Whitehead's philosophy and Christian faith is widely disputed, 
it would seem that Cobb should endeavor to demonstrate its 
reality. 26 
Cobb's inattention to this problem is reflected also in his 
neglect of an essential difference between the theological 
enterprise of Augustine and Thomas (as he himself describes it) 
a6 A short step in this direction is taken by Norman Pittenger, "A 
Contemporary Trend in North American Theology: Process-Thought 
and Christian Faith," RL, XXXIV (1964-65), $02-03. But this neces- 
sarily brief statement is hardly convincing. 
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and his own endeavor. For them the objective was to adapt 
philosophical categories for the elucidation of a Christian 
theological perspective ; for him the objective is quite different 
(P. 269) : 
At no point. . . have I intended to replace philosophical argument 
by dogmatic assertion or to distort Whitehead so as to render him 
more amenable to Christian use. My attempt has been to make the 
philosophical doctrines conform to the philosophical norms. . . . 
A Christian natural theology must not be a hybrid of philosophy 
and Christian convictions. It must be philosophically responsible 
throughout. 
I t  is remarkable that Cobb apparently fails to recognize how 
different his stance is from that of Augustine and Thomas ; 
his allegiance to Whitehead's philosophical principles is in 
sharp contrast to their willingness to "distort" the philosophi- 
cal systems they adopted in order to make them "more 
amenable to Christian use. " 
I am not here contending that Cobb's enterprise is wrong- 
headed; the point is that to label it "Christian natural 
theology" and to imply a parallel to the work of Augustine 
and Thomas is an unfortunate source of confusion if his 
principal interest is philosophical-and this seems certainly 
the case. Nor is the confusion eliminated by reference to his 
singularly broad definition of theology as "any coherent 
statement about matters of ultimate concern that recognizes 
that the perspective by which it is governed is received from a 
community of faith') (p. 252). This definition merely re- 
introduces the question of the immediate identification of 
Whit eheadian philosophy, which is clearly "the perspective 
by which [Cobb's "Christian natural theology"] is governed," 
as the perspective which can be reasonably understood to be 
"received from a [Christian] community of faith." 
If Cobb is in fact writing "Christian natural theology," his 
work is subject to two sets of critical criteria; this is the price 
that is always required of those who would carry on an inter- 
disciplinary project. To the extent that natural theology is 
philosophical, he is correct to observe that it must be judged 
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qua philosophical, and not hopefully received just because of 
its Christian convictions. But to the extent that natural 
theology is theological and Christian, there ought to be an 
equal openness to criticism in these terms. Yet this latter 
element is missing; why? Perhaps because of an epistemo- 
logical assumption that quite naturally accompanies White- 
headian philosophy: the susceptibility of all truth, including 
theological truth, to metaphysical rationalization. In other 
words, there is here an undiscussed question of theological 
authority which, so long as it remains undiscussed, is just as 
subversive of sound theology as is the undiscussed ontological 
assumptions against which Cobb properly warns. 
It is instructive to recall that whenever philosophical 
categories have become, intentionally or by default, authorita- 
tive in a system of Christian theology (as in Gnosticism and 
Deism), the system has become heretical. This is the historical 
part of the reason why some theologians have been so skeptical 
of any kind of philosophical theology that they have (un- 
fortunately) denied its usefulness altogether. 
Just as theological affirmations are never completely 
neutral ontologically, so metaphysical systems are never 
completely neutral theologically. Therefore any philosophy 
not consciously constructed in terms of specifically Christian 
thought-and no important philosophy has been originally 
constructed in this way-will probably carry implications that 
are hostile to Christian theology. So long as Cobb intends to 
write Christian theology he ought to recognize that the 
"community of faith" provides not only its context but also, 
in an important sense, the criteria for its validity-in the form 
of scripture or tradition or present experience or some com- 
bination of these. Where the implications of these criteria 
conflict with his philosophical conclusions, he has only two 
theologically sound options: he can either subordinate the 
philosophical interests to the theological, or he can learn to 
live with the tension between them. To ignore the necessity 
of rigorous criticism in the light of theological norms, as he 
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has apparently done, is to create a "natural theology" that 
is not genuine theology at all, and may well go the way- 
ultimately-of Gnosticism and Deism. As it stands, his work 
might more appropriately be called A Whiteheadian. Ph&?osophy 
of Religion. 26 
Although it has just been suggested that Cobb's presentation 
is incomplete as it stands, it may be assumed that a fuller 
discussion in the future will tend to clarify rather than 
modify the conception of God he has expressed. The following 
paragraphs are therefore intended as a brief discusssion of this 
conception when considered from the context of Christian 
theology. 27 That is to say, I am here attempting to indicate 
the kind of questions that Cobb needs to examine very 
thoroughly if his doctrine of God is to be received (in spite 
of the methodological impediments) as theologically accept- 
able. 28 
(I) A basic question is whether or not Christian theology 
can accommodate a metaphysical rationalization of God. 
2e It is possible that the two issues raised in this section-the assump- 
tion of the fundamental compatibility of Whiteheadian philosophy and 
Christian theology, and the neglect of theological norms as valid 
criteria for philosophical theology-were intentionally excluded from 
the initial presentation of A Christian NaturaE Theology. Thus the 
present complaint may be merely a reflection of unwarranted irritation 
over (a) a misjudgment of the book's objective, resulting from a 
literalistic reading of its title and an accompanying failure to take the 
subtitle seriously enough, andlor (b) the fact that Cobb did not write 
the book that this reader wanted and expected him to write. But he 
does imply (p. 252)  that he has now said what he believes needs to be 
said on the subject, and that his future writing is likely to move to 
other areas, such as Christology and soteriology (p. 12). 
"Christian theology" may be defined, for the purposes of this 
discussion, as the central understanding of God, man, and the world 
shared generally by classical, Reformation, and (to a lesser extent) 
contemporary Christian thought. 
Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics, pp. 382- 
413, shows an awareness of the importance of this task, although he 
himself does not really attempt it. 
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Here the divergence seems radical in both meanings of the 
word--degree and depth. For Christian thought has always 
maintained, even in its most rationalistic forms, a final 
incomprehensibility as part of its basic understanding of deity. 
There is, to be sure, much less conflict between Whiteheadian 
thought and popular piety, which has always tended to 
forget that it knows God only by means of symbols, and that 
the symbols are necessarily anthropomorphic. And it is also 
to be noted that neither the Whiteheadian God nor the popular 
Christian God is wholly open to human understanding: the 
reasons why things are what they are, and happen as they do, 
are veiled in the mystery of the divine nature. Nevertheless 
the general "feeling" about God is that he is rational and 
regular. 
But theology is not so easily satisfied as is popular piety, 
especially in regard to the assumption of regularity (which 
is the ground of rationality)-the assumption that all things 
are what they are because that is what they must be. Thus 
theology denies what piety tends to accept, namely, the idea 
of "God. . . in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground" 
(PR 529). Theology insists that God's aseity (or, as Whitehead 
liked to put it, the fact that God is causa szci) means that he 
is transcendent not only in the Whiteheadian sense of the 
freedom of self-creativity but also in the sense of freedom 
from all other entities and principles-rational, metaphysical, 
or whatever-encompassed by human thought. Whitehead 
himself points in this direction when he identifies God as the 
ground of rationality; yet he does not really mean ultimate 
ground, but only proximate ground. 
This problem has afflicted most philosophers' Gods, who 
are what the various metaphysical systems let them be and 
cannot be anything else. But in such cases "God" seems an 
inappropriate word, for what the philosophers too often 
describe seems more like a cosmic functionary, obediently 
performing his duties. The idea of a "rationalized God" is 
simply a more sophisticated formulation of the self-contra- 
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dictory notion of a "conditioned God." The question is 
whether a meaningful concept of God requires--or, on the 
other hand, allows-his nature and function to be conditioned 
by the rational categories of a fully consistent ontology. 29 
Again, it is not the point of this article to show that the 
Whiteheadian assumption ought not to be made; the point 
is that the question of a "rationalized God" involves a funda- 
mental vision of reality, and that here Whiteheadian meta- 
physics and Christian theology do not seem compatible. 
The latter insists that ontology is an expression of God's 
nature andlor being ; the former insists that God is an instance 
of metaphysical principles. The question is: is God within 
the system or outside it ? Can philosophy include God or only 
point to him ? 
(2) Besides the formal question of the relation of God to the 
philosophical system, there is also the material question of 
the relation of God to cosmic process itself, that is, the relation 
of God to the world by means of creation. Cobb takes two 
important steps toward the theological affirmation of God 
29 I t  may be objected that this whole argument is based on a con- 
fusion of the order of being with the order of knowing, and that neither 
Whitehead nor Cobb nor any other metaphysician is really "imprisoning 
God within a metaphysical system" as is here implied, but that each 
is describing ultimate reality on the basis of the evidence he encounters. 
In  other words, just as the statement, "I see a green patch; therefore 
there is grass beneath my window," does not mean that the patch of 
green I see is the ontological cause of the grass, but only the ground of 
my knowing that the grass is there, so also the statement, "I see an 
orderly world ; therefore God functions within a metaphysical order," 
does not mean that what I see (and subsequently formulate logically 
into a metaphysical system) is the cause of ultimate reality but only 
the ground of my knowing what ultimate reality is like. But both 
statements presuppose (a) the comprehensibility of that to which 
the evidence points (for example, grass qua grass is knowable), 
and (b) an ontological correspondence between the evidence itself 
and that reality to which i t  points (grass is in fact green). In the case 
of the grass, these presuppositions may be verified to the point of 
practical certainty; in the case of ultimate reality, they remain funda- 
mental assumptions upon which the Whiteheadian and other philoso- 
phical concepts of God rest. 
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as Creator. First, by emphasizing the unity of the primordial 
and consequent natures of God he makes possible an under- 
standing of causal efficacy in a way that Whitehead did not 
clearly establish: God's role in creation becomes "actual" or 
"concrete." Secondly, Cobb makes God the reason for the 
existence of anything as well as the primary factor in its 
particular form. But he is still far from affirming God as a 
Creator who creates ex nihilo, for not only do creativity 
and eternal objects (which are not actual entities) remain 
equiprimordial with God, but so does the world. To use a 
clumsy metaphor: God pushes the button that lets creativity 
flow into actual entities, and at  the same time regulates the 
amperage, voltage, and alternation of the current; but he is 
not the source of the current. God is an element in the process, 
indeed its supreme element; but he is not its ground. 
The subordination of God to process brings other, derivative 
difficulties. In the first place, i t  effectively removes God from 
the definition of evil, and so empties that concept of theological 
meaning. As a corollary to the argument that if God is "the 
foundation of the metaphysical system with its ultimate 
activity" he must be the source of evil, Whitehead says that 
"it stands in His very nature to divide the Good from the 
Evil" (SMW 161). Although Whitehead does not elaborate 
his meaning, i t  can have no connection with any kind of 
divine "will," for God is not to be understood in terms of 
volition. Presumably the idea is that the initial aim which 
God supplies to every occasion is the Good, since it derives 
from God's subjective aim for his own satisfaction and is 
thus a part of the creative advance that is the goal of eternal 
process. A creative decision in each concrescent occasion can 
adjust this initial aim in the light of (a) aims inherited from 
other occasions and (b) its own immediate prehension of 
eternal objects (these two are Cobb's suggestions), as well 
as (c) its own "subjective form" or "effective feeling"; but 
this hardly corresponds to the Christian idea of radical 
disobedience, rebellion, or sin. In the Whiteheadian system 
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evil is incoherence, a conflict of cross-purposes; and in the 
nature of things it "promotes its own elimination" (RM 94). 
I t  is not by oversight that Cobb omits the idea of evil from 
his chapter on the nature of religion ; there is no real connection 
between the two ideas. 30 
In the second place, if God is only part of creative process 
and not its ultimate ground, the concept of worship is con- 
siderably weakened. Even if Cobb is right in saying that 
"one does not worship in order to  achieve some good. One 
worships because that which he dimly apprehends evokes 
worship" (pp. 216-17), the question remains whether a finite 
God-who is "in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical 
ground" (PR 529) and who is as ontologically dependent on 
the world as the world is dependent on him-does in fact 
evoke worship in the Christian sense. If he is not really 
Creator he can hardly be Saviour, except in the sense of 
stimulating an awareness of meaning in a function analogous 
to that of a great philosopher or prophet or poet, whose 
insight lights up some aspect of reality for others. If that is all 
that exists to be worshipped, it is difficult to see how the 
act of worship can retain any essential meaning for a Christian. 
Whether a doctrine of God that (a) limits his function and 
being to a prescribed place in a metaphysical construction, 
(b) expands the category of ultimacy to include the world 
of actual entities as well as God, (c) divorces God from the 
concept of evil, and (d) eliminates the primary ground for 
worship, can serve as an expression of Christian belief is a 
question that Cobb and his fellow Whiteheadians ought not 
to evade. 
The underlying optimism about the upward direction of the eter- 
nal process seems axiomatic with Cobb as well as with Whitehead, 
and provides a significant point of contact between them and Teilhard 
de Chardin. Cf. Cobb, "Christian Natural Theology and Christian 
Existence," CC, LXXXII (1965)~ 266. 
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The predominantly negative tone of the second half of 
this article tends to obscure the possibility that Whteheadian 
thought may yet furnish (or point to) ways of thinking useful 
to a formulation of a theologically valid and intellectually 
meaningful doctrine of God. 
Certainly the idea of primordial and consequent natures, 
especially as revised and unified by Cobb, is a suggestive 
way of understanding the relationship of God's transcendence, 
absoluteness, and eternity on the one hand and his relatedness 
and responsiveness to history on the other. I t  seems to make 
less difficult-though of course not more true-the simultane- 
ous affirmations that God is ontologically unconditioned and 
that what he experiences is in a certain sense dependent on 
human response, so that how human beings use their creaturely 
freedom does make a difference to him. However much the 
idea of the love of God is interpreted as disinterested agape, 
it must retain the idea that the world matters to God, and 
this must mean that he is in some way experientially con- 
ditioned by it. And the "two natures" concept also facilitates 
the affirmation of a real pastness in God, an affirmation 
that is closely related to the possibility of directionality 
and meaning in time. That is, for God as well as for man, 
Creation, Incarnation, and Redemption must be an order 
of events; a t  least it is impossible to conceive of them as 
significant without such an order. 
Another possible contribution is the indirect suggestion of 
Creativity, Creative Agency, and Creative Forms as aspects 
of the creative process. These three elements can be assimilated 
to the idea of a transcendent, sovereign God; whether they 
form some sort of analogy to the Trinity is another (and 
interesting) question. In any case, their combination may 
offer a useful way of understanding the function of God in 
relation to the world. 
Finally, the idea of "initial aim" may point to a way of 
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understanding providence and/or the operation of the Holy 
Spirit. It is interesting that even though Calvin was un- 
attracted to this kind of speculation, his doctrine of particular 
providence may be explicated metaphysically in such a way 
that it too involves God as selecting the causal factors opera- 
tive in each occasion. At the same time, aspects of White- 
headian thought may make it possible to maintain-in 
contrast to Calvin-human freedom and moral responsi- 
bility. This philosophical correlation of God's universal 
efficacy and man's self-determination may well be a theo- 
logically important development. 
a1 Cf. Cobb, "The Philosophical Grounds of Moral Responsibility : 
A Comment on Matson and Niebuhr," The Journal of Philosophy, 
LVI (1g5g), 619-21. 
